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The Mirage of Rights - Response
By ELAZAR BARKAN*
The formulation of a desire of repatriation as a "right of return"
exists in the twilight zone between a political ideology and legal
analysis. Numerous articles, here and in other forms, have explicated
the various precedents and international customary law that provide
ostensibly this right. The essence of these claims is that a
combination of U.N. Security Council resolutions, various
international instruments from the Universal Declarations of Human
Rights through the Geneva Convention to the policies advocated by
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding
repatriation all point to the fact that the conventional international
norm is to support the right of refugees to return to their former
country. Justifiably, there are numerous points of contention which
debate whether the right of return is to one's own home or country or
region, whether these rights apply to descendants, both individuals
and states, and what are the alternatives for repatriation. These are
all important issues, and in a particular context may prove to be of
consequences. However I would like to direct the attention to an
alternative question: do the refugees benefit from the moral economy
of the discourse of the right of return? Put differently, does the
construction of the refugee solution in the language of rights is
beneficial or inhuman to the suffering refugees. I propose to suggest
an answer to this question by looking at comparative cases and
imagining the likelihood of a solution.
One may begin with the question of international norms. There
are two issues to consider. The first is that notwithstanding the
extensive ostensible legal precedents, there is not international
prohibition of population transfers. Consequently, the rights of
repatriation are derivative of other rights. Let it be clear: the
argument is not that population transfer is legal, rather that the
international community, despite the numerous conventions and
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agreements which touch on various aspects of human rights, including
the political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights, has never
found it possible to make the involuntary transfer of population the
subject of international convention. This should alert us to the
complexity of the topic. The rights of the child have been codified.
Not the rights of the refugee, not the right of the individual or a group
not to be displaced from its home against its wish. This is a significant
omission which is unlikely to be amended any time soon.
The other significant absence in the language of repatriation is
the actual rarity of the return. Although the language of repatriation
is widespread, the fact of repatriation itself is rather limited. One
must distinguish between repatriation across the ethnic divide and the
repatriation of people to areas where their own ethnicity and nation
are a majority. In the international community parler one talks about
minority return. There have been millions of refugees who have been
repatriated over the years, although many more have been
permanently displaced. Among those who have returned, the vast
majority are those who belonged to the dominant majority in their
country/region. Thus, recent Afghans who returned from Pakistan
and Iran, among others, return to a place where their own kin are in
the majority. Bangladesh saw nine million repatriated. Many other
millions, however, never return. This is especially true regarding the
refugees in the immediate aftermath of WWII, in both Europe and
the Indian subcontinent, where between 30 and 40 million refugees
were displaced because of their ethnicity and religion and were never
repatriated.
In the former Yugoslavia, the situation is illuminating both in its
possibilities and limitations. Bosnia and Kosovo in particular, and the
former Yugoslavia in general, are the most prominent examples of
the possibilities and challenges facing refugee policies and the right of
return. Bosnia is one of the few cases where the right of return across
the ethnic divide, minority return, was explicitly established in an
international agreement. The Dayton Peace Accord included explicit
provisions for the voluntary return of refugees or alternative
compensation. The international community invested consistent
efforts and resources in implementing the repatriation and pursuing
justice through prosecuting the worst criminals in The Hague. This
may be the most comprehensive effort the international community
can envision of reconstituting a society following ethnic cleansing and
the destruction of the war. By 2004, just under a million returned to
their homes, mostly to communities where they were part of the
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majority ethnicity. 1.2 million others remained displaced.
Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, UNHCR
recorded the return of 989,080 refugees and displaced persons
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of this number, 610,369 (62%)
are Bosniak, 127,719 (13%) are Croat, 243,046 (24%) are Serb, and
7,946 (1%) are others. Since 1996, a total number of 437,270 so-called
minority returnees have returned to their homes in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNHCR figures). The precision of the figures should
not be confused with accuracy. Many figures are under and over
reported. How is one to think about the success or failure of
repatriation? Are we to look to those who returned or those who
remained refugees? Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other
organizations and activists on behalf of the refugees often emphasize
the amount of work still need to be done. But is that the best way to
evaluate the repatriation? 1
Minority repatriation faced opposition from all three ethnic
groups in communities where they were a majority. In the first years
after the peace there was a net loss of about 50,000 minorities from
majority areas. According to UNHCR, up to seventy per cent (70%)
of the people who repatriated in the nineties were relocated The
years 2000-2003 provided a window where many minority refugees
returned. External intervention was crucial. The increased pace of
repatriation in 2000 resulted in part from the aggressive tactic taken
by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia to fire
government officials who obstructed the return. The action had
certain impact and during three years (2000-2002) more minority
refugees returned. The nature of the return was more temporary
than the official data discloses. Many "returned" only as a claim to
repossess their property and promptly sell it. This return was for
many a form of compensation, more then reintegration of the ethnic
communities. The precise impediments in Serbia and Croatia differ,
1. For a critique of the figures in general see, Human Rights Watch, "Croatia
Broken Promises: Impediments to Refugee Return to Croatia," September 2003 Vol.
15, No. 6 (D). Bogdan Ivanisevic, Legacy of War: Minority Returns in the Balkans
HRW, 2004. 1. For a critique of the figures in general see, HRW, Croatia Broken
Promises: Impediments to Refugee Return to Croatia, September 2003 Vol. 15, No. 6
(D). Bogdan Ivanisevic, Legacy of War: Minority Returns in the Balkans, Human
Rights Warch, 2004 available at <http://hrw.org/wr2k4/16.htm#_Toc58744965>.
2. Refugee Reports, Vol. XVIII, No. 7, p. 10, International Crisis Group Going
Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia. Also Amnesty
International Bosnia-Herzegovina: All the way home - Safe "minority returns" as a
just remedy and for a secure future. (February 1998) EUR 63/02/98.
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but the result was similar. Significantly there are no statistics about
how many repatriated minority people stay in their old homes or
places, and how many move on after selling their property. Extensive
investment of international resources and political capital resulted in
a partial repatriation and much frustration. Repatriation did not
mean return to one's pre-war community.
Most of the returnees initially were the elderly. In many places
the return involved ethnic violence. The makeup of every local
community, its history, current and past demographic composition, as
well as the political leadership, all shaped the reintegration. The
willingness of displaced Bosnians to return depended largely on
anticipation and experience of reception in the areas of return. The
role of Bosnian politicians in fostering or resisting policies conducive
to return remained crucial. The complexities of the repossession of
property are a major impediment to return in all regions, as is
insufficient reconstruction assistance. Since the actual houses are
unavailable, the compensation and reconstruction play a large role in
the attempted repatriation. Despite the delays, the obstacles and the
frustrated aspiration, progress has been made.
The victorious sides in the former Yugoslavia were ethnic
nationalists on all sides. In Bosnia, the peace accord called for an
ethnically integrated state, even if each region was to be dominated
by a strong group. Nobody expected a peaceful future, least of all the
Bosnian Serb leadership who knew better than anyone else the extent
of their responsibility to the carnage. They opposed ethnic
reintegration, not only the reintegration of Croats and Muslims into
the RS, but also the repatriation of Bosnian Serbs back into the
Federation. Their preference was to relocate displaced Serbs to areas
of strategic importance, and anticipated future conflict.
Refugee repatriation claims both reintegration and the
prevention of regional conflict. This is a credo that cannot be
examined empirically. In the former Yugoslavia, it is impossible to
know whether in the long term the repatriation would enable true
integration, and it would be premature to judge the policy by the
current results. Yet, if we examine the ethnic reconciliation where
minority return is taking place in the short run, the most favorable
conclusion could be that repatriation is a mixed bag. That may signal
a great success, though one would not know it from reading the
opinions of activists and advocates. Before 2000, there was little
confidence in the Dayton process, and the conventional wisdom was
that attempts at repatriation have only compounded the ethnic
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polarization. That may have been based on the pressures faced by
Bosnia and the general belief that the state would not survive. How
the years since and the relative improved, if limited, ethnic
repatriation would lead to reintegration, only time would tell.
The large number of refugees and internally displaced persons
(IDPs) who have returned but not to their homes presents a dilemma
as to our understanding of a return. Refugees who are repatriated
not to their homes ought really to be counted as IDPs under
conventional definition. If this definition was applied, there would be
many more IDPs and far fewer returnees in Bosnia. Yet, because
many of those were resettled, they are no longer considered to be
refugees. As a humanitarian policy, as well as a matter of
reconciliation, this turns out to be successful policy. In terms of
reporting, the result is misleading: these should be counted as
resettled, not returnees. If this criterion would have applied, the
repatriation in Bosnia would have included far smaller numbers.
Rights and Political Power
The most extensive repatriation in the former Yugoslavia took
place in Kosovo. NATO defeat of the Serbs led to the flooding back
of Kosovars in 1999, and the expulsion of many Serbs. The
repatriation was achieved at the expense of a smaller new ethnic
cleansing. The West was appalled but did little to reverse the
expulsion of the Serbs. Four years later another explosive ethnic
violence led to more expulsion, eliciting the international response of
compassion and regret, but no action. Kosovo remains in a political
limbo, which assures future violence and expulsions.
In Rwanda the Tutsi victory led to the repatriation of the Tutsi
and the expulsion of numerous Hutus. Following the victory, and the
ideology of Rwandaness, which reputedly does not distinguish
between Hutu and Tutsi, many Hutu were allowed to return. Others
remain in neighboring countries, among others funding the civil war
in the DR Congo. One may hesitate in predicting how long the ethnic
ceasefire may last.
Extensive minority repatriation took place in both Kosovo and
Rwanda. Minority in Kosovo only means that as long as Kosovo is
part of Serbia, the Kosovars are a minority. But the political reality is
that the repatriation was by a minority that became victorious and
took revenge of the previous majority. Political power was the
determining factor. In Rwanda the situation was similar. The
2005]
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victorious Tutsi were numerically fewer, but had the political power.
By analogy, the victorious power at some level in Bosnia was the
international coalition led by the Americans and the Europeans.
Their priority was repatriation. Yet they found it very difficult to
implement.
In none of these situations did the nominal question of "rights"
play a significant role. Reconciliation or domination was the
determining ideology. But more significant than the content of the
political ideology were the interests of the victorious power. The
international civil society continuously demanded that more be done,
and illuminated the shortcomings, but could only marginally influence
the policies. In short, although repatriation as a principle enjoys wide
support, in practice minority return is hardly ever implemented, and
when it does it is more as might than right.
The legacy of these repatriation cases to the Palestinians is fairly
straight forward. As long as Israel is more powerful, and as long as it
enjoys the support of the United States, it is very unlikely to accept
the repatriation of the refugees in large numbers. Those who support
the use of force have their own rationale, though perhaps their
timescale may leave something to be desired. The peaceful
alternative of maintaining the focus on the right of return is worthy,
though one wonders how the principle is intertwined with
consideration of the impact on the refugees.
Palestinian Refugees - Nostalgia and the Politics of Return
Nostalgia mediates for Palestinian refugees the desire for
security and improved standard of living as compared with the harsh
realities of life experiences. The ideology and commitment to return
cling to the notion of repatriation as a distant and impractical solution
in the face of real desperation. The devastation of the political
struggle, corruption and political impotence combines together with
distrust of the world and the local and national conditions to bring
about any material improvement. For example, a realistic analysis of
the shortcomings of the political process is salvaged from the jaws of
despair by an implicit belief that repatriation would cut the Gordian
knot of suffering, that Return would be a return to the "good old
days," though never existed in reality, would provide salvation.
The harsh political and social realities are very clearly and
perceptively analyzed by the "average" Palestinian refugee only to
hang on in the face of despair to the "right of return" through the
[Vol128: 3
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imagery of life at the old home. The political rhetoric constructs both
the analysis of despair and the belief in return as realistic. Yet,
realism here carries distinct meanings when criticizing corruption as
compared with adhering to the idea of the erstwhile home. But the
two are not divorced. It is precisely the realistic analysis by refugees
that they are not going to benefit from the peace process, because
their interests are unrepresented, because of corruption and lack of
adequate resources that combines into a frustration which radicalizes
the ranks and is manifested in holding on to the essence of identity as
being refugee. The intangible becomes the reality; the home that is
absent becomes the core of the identity. No one can deprive the
refugee of this intangible identity - neither the political leadership nor
a bilateral agreement. The right becomes a dream and a desire to a
complete and secure past. The right of return conveys a desire and an
identity, not a political program. The two are confused by all
involved; Israelis and Palestinians alike make the intangible a real
source of conflict and suffering.
Israel certainly has responsibilities towards the refugees. There
are those who believe these responsibilities are clear. I doubt it. The
historical record is complicated, and while it is significant, the
responsibilities can be adjudicated in one of three ways: a subjective
recognition by the responsible party (Israel), an agreement between
the sides (the peace process), or an external international imposition,
either political or judiciary. I find all unlikely. If one accepts this as
political realism, the question is what is to be done? The demand that
Israel acknowledges its responsibility should not, however, be
translated into holding the refugees hostage until such time.
Many Palestinians consider the principle of the right of return to
be sacred, but its implementation to be subject to political
negotiations. Various permutations of this conclusion are displayed
from Arafat through opinion polls in the occupied territories to civil
society peace plans (such as by Nusseibeh and the Geneva Accord).
Others see the right of return as a political program, among them
many refugees and other hard liners. While Israelis who object to
withdrawal from the territories and supporters of Palestinian right of
return disagree on almost everything else, both sides underscore the
immalleable notion of return; for the former it justifies the fear and
the rejection of peace, for the latter it underscores the rejection of
compromise.
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Suffering and Rights
Rights famously exist beyond utilitarian considerations.
Formulating refugee interests as rights elevates, supposedly, the
interests of the group above political horse trading, avoiding the
corruption of policies, aiming to the higher moral ground. The cost
for this is significant. By privileging utopian repatriation over
resettlement and short term political resolution, the refugees are
doomed to longer, multi-generational suffering. The choice in the
1950s to reject resettlement of the Palestinian refugees was done for
cynical political reasons by the Arab rulers who were hoping to defeat
Israel and use the suffering of the refugees to apply pressure on
Israel. The political misjudgment increased the number of refugees
from 700,000-800,000 in 1949 to 3-4 million today. When we consider
the many who have died in the meantime, the total number of those
who suffered as refugees and the politically instability that the
refugees' existence inserted into the region, including the civil wars
Jordan and Lebanon, the number of those who have suffered directly
from the continuation of the unresolved situation is untold. But it
would not be an understatement to say that the permanence of the
refugee situation is the most volatile political issue in the region, and
that the refugees are made to carry the heavy burden.
The language of rights has a cost. To focus on the "just" solution
to the exclusion of other options, assumes that the continuous
suffering is less important than the historical justice, or that the
essential sacred return is more important than alleviating the
immediate suffering of the refugees. The Palestinian population is
young and fertile. The demographic growth is among the highest
globally. In the next generation,if the refugee suffering is not
resolved, many more millions are doomed to repeat their parents'
experiences. The international experience in Bosnia suggests that
international pressure is important and can bring positive results. It
also shows how limited that impact is. These experiences and
expectations have to be calibrated to the more complex situation in
Israel/Palestine.
The UNHCR provides for three methods to address refugee
crisis: repatriation; resettlement; and migration to third countries.
The former is the preferred solution today, though for the first three
decades after WWII resettlement was preferred. Supporters of
Palestinians' rights often emphasize that the Palestinian refugees have
suffered longest without having their status resolved. This is mostly
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true, but it must be remembered that the thirty plus millions who
were made refugees at about the same time have been resettled, not
repatriated. Indeed of the refugees after WWII, hardly anyone was
repatriated.
The language of rights notoriously includes issues that contradict
each other. Rights are more likely to conflict with than complement
each other. Isaiah Berlin taught many years ago that even the most
fundamental aspiration of rights such as freedom and equality are
contradictory. To imagine that we can articulate rights beyond the
political is myopic, and it is the weaker members of society that suffer
most. In this case, the refugees.
To resolve the Palestinian refugee problem, all three methods
must be employed. While the right to return has its supporters, it has
been a bane of Palestinian existence by increasing suffering.
Maintaining the priority of return over solution exposes the refugees
to both further suffering and repeat policies of the Arab leaders who
have used the refugees as hostages in their struggle with Israel. This
observation says nothing about Israel's responsibility and duties. It
only states that prolonging the suffering of refugees is neither a moral
nor an efficient way of achieving this target. For those who think
Israel ought to pay for its responsibility of the refugee problem, the
focus should be on making Israel pay, not on delaying and denying
the refugees resettlement. That many refugees themselves believe in
the superiority of Return at the expense of any suffering does not
make it more effective or moral. Various plans during the peace
process have been put forward. But for any plan to work there has to
be recognition that all three methods have to be part of the solution.
2005]
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